competing plans attract a disproportionately healthy mix of enrollees while others attract a disproportionately sick enrollee mix, plan costs, premiums, and profits will reflect risk selection in addition to efficiency. Over the long run, health plans will receive the incentive to compete via selective enrollment of healthy and disenrollment of sick individuals rather than through price reductions and quality enhancements. [2] [3] [4] Many observers believe that health maintenance organizations (HMOs) are benefitting from favorable risk selection, mainly because of the reluctance of persons with significant medical care needs to break relationships with their existing physicians and This study used FFS plan claims and HMO hospital discharge records to compare pre-switch and post-switch utilization for employees and dependents who switched from a FFS health plan to a group-model HMO between 1981 and 1984 . The analysis is limited to inpatient utilization, because outpatient data were not available from the HMO. Employees and dependents continuously enrolled in the FFS plan and the HMO were used as control groups. We focus initially on maternity, a diagnostic category in which hospital admission is nondiscretionary for the HMO, but in which inpatient days may be influenced by the HMO's costcontainment program. We then analyze nonmaternity utilization, which includes discretionary as well as nondiscretionary admissions.
Dynamic and Steady-State Risk Selection
It is important to distinguish the hypothesis that individuals switch health plans in anticipation of changing medical care needs (and possibly defer or "store up" some utili-44 zation for the post-switch period) from the more conventional hypothesis that individuals' decisions to switch plans are influenced by their health care needs. The "storing up" hypothesis refers to changes over time in the propensity of any one individual to use services. In contrast, the conventional risk selection hypothesis refers to time-invariant differences among two or more individuals in the propensity to use services. In the following discussion, we will discuss these two hypotheses in terms of "dynamic" and "steady-state" risk selection.
Most discussions of plan switching focus on whether persons with greater (steadystate) medical care needs are more or less likely than persons with fewer needs to choose an HMO over a conventional FFS plan. It is commonly argued that persons with greater needs are less likely to switch health plans because of strong existing bonds to their physicians. Because most persons "begin" in a FFS plan and must switch to join an HMO, this physician-affiliation perspective predicts that HMOs will enroll a disproportionately healthy population. To the extent that the need for services does not change over time or, at a minimum, that such changes are not correlated with the decision to switch plans, an analysis of preswitch utilization will correctly identify patterns of steady-state risk selection. The conventional risk selection study design, which focuses on utilization by prospective switchers while still enrolled in the FFS plan, potentially separates the effects of risk selection from the effects (if any) of the HMO itself on utilization. Even if they were available, utilization data from switchers after joining the HMO could not differentiate risk selection effects from HMO utilization-control effects. In any event, post-switch utilization data usually are not available.
The dynamic risk-selection hypothesis asserts that anticipated changes in health care needs may prompt a switch of health plan.
The most plausible direction of selection This creates a 3 X 3 matrix of possibilities.
In practice, however, three of the nine cells in the matrix are of greatest importance. The obvious baseline case for comparisons is no steady-state risk selection and no dynamic risk selection (random selection). Given the strong effect of patient-physician affiliations on plan switching, the other two interesting cases are those that assume favorable steady-state risk selection for the HMO. One case assumes no dynamic risk selection; this is the case compared with the baseline (random selection) case in the conventional switcher study design.5-7 The third possibility combines favorable steady-state risk selection for the HMO with adverse dynamic risk selection ("storing up") for the HMO. Table 1 presents the three most interesting combinations of steady-state and dynamic risk selection, with their predictions concerning pre-switch and post-switch patterns of hospital admissions for FFS plan switchers and stayers. The first case predicts equal rates of admission in the pre-switch period ("Year 1") for both discretionary and nondiscretionary causes of admission. In the post-switch period ("Year 2"), the rate of nondiscretionary admissions is still identical for switchers (now enrolled in the HMO) compared with those staying in the FFS plan. To the extent HMOs discourage discretionary hospital admissions, however, the rate of discretionary admissions in Year 2 should be lower for switchers than for stayers. We represent this by a post-switch rate of discretionary admissions f times the pre-switch rate, where 0 < f <1. Therefore, the HMO's effect on discretionary admissions, in percentage terms, is (1 -3) X 100.
The second case assumes sicker patients are less likely to switch into an HMO than healthier patients (favorable steady-state risk selection for the HMO), and that health care needs for any one individual do not change (or, rather, that any such changes are uncorrelated with plan switching). In this scenario, admission rates in Year 1 for switchers are a fraction a of the rates for stayers, 0 < a < 1. The fraction for nondiscretionary admissions (a1) may differ from the fraction for discretionary admissions In practice, it is impossible to clearly distinguish discretionary from nondiscretionary admissions using provider reimbursement claims and hospital discharge abstracts. In this study we divide admissions into maternity and nonmaternity diagnoses. Maternity diagnoses are nondiscretionary admissions from the health plan's perspective, while nonmaternity diagnoses cover a diverse mix of discretionary and nondiscretionary admissions. The nonexperimental literature8
and the RAND Health Insurance Experiment9 report nonmaternity admission rates for HMOs that are 20% lower than rates for FFS plans with a 20% to 25% consumer copayment. If the "nondiscretionary admissions" column in Table 1 Table 2 presents rates of maternity admissions and inpatient days for FFS plan stayers, HMO stayers, and FFS-to-HMO switchers. The rate of maternity admission more than doubled (106% increase) for plan switchers after they joined the HMO (P < 0.001). By way of contrast, the maternity admission rate for FFS stayers declined by 12% (P < 0.001) between Year 1 and Year 2 and that for HMO stayers did not change.
While the Year 1 rate of maternity admission for switchers was 22% lower than the rate for FFS stayers (P = 0.038), it was 81% higher in Year 2 (P < 0.001). After joining the HMO in Year 2, switchers experienced the same rate of maternity admissions as HMO stayers. The data on maternity inpatient days, presented in the third and fourth rows of Table 2 , confirm the evidence obtained from the admission rates.
Rates of admission and inpatient days for nonmaterity diagnoses among switchers and stayers are presented in Table 3 . The 
Steady-State and Dynamic Risk Selection
The data in Tables 2 and 3 can be interpreted in terms of the conceptual matrix presented in Table 1 The perception among many employers, policymakers, and industry observers that HMOs are benefitting from favorable selection at the expense of FFS health plans is based largely on studies that compare utilization rates for individuals switching plans with those for individuals remaining in FFS plans. Our study suggests that this is unreliable evidence concerning the true distribution of risk among HMOs and FFS plans. We focussed on maternity admissions because they are a frequently occurring and easily measurable form of nondiscretionary medical care for the Bank of America employee population (72% of which was between 18 and 45 years of age). Other data could be used to analyze plan switching in anticipation of nonmaternity forms of care (i.e., Medicare data for surgical procedures common among the elderly).
Risk selection is a potentially serious problem for health insurance markets. The existing literature based on analyses of preswitch utilization by prospective plan switchers, however, provides a potentially misleading perspective on the magnitude and possibly even the direction of the bias. 
